A fair level of provisions on bad and doubtful loans is an essential input in mark-to-market accounting, and in the calculation of bank proÞtability, capital and solvency. Surprisingly, recent micro studies on loan loss-given-default have not been exploited to derive provisioning schedules. Two methodologies to calculate a fair level of loan-loss provisions, at the time of default and after the default date, are developed in the paper. To illustrate, the methodology is applied to a private data set of non-performing loans. The estimated dynamic provisioning schedule is then compared to a regulatory schedule imposed by a central bank. * The authors are grateful to Professor J. Santos Silva for his insights in the econometrics of fractional responses, to M. Suominen , L. Wall, and J. Wahlen for comments on a Þrst draft, to J. Cropper for editorial assistance, and to Banco Comercial Português (Millenium BCP) for access to internal credit data.
Introduction
Fair provisioning on bad and doubtful loans is of great importance for investors and bank regulators. Consider the merits of Basel II, the revised capital accord that would much better capture the actual risks taken by banks (Basel Committee, 2004) . It is quite evident that this accord will not have much relevance if the measurement of bank capital is not satisfactory. A key input in the measurement of bank capital is the amount of loan-loss provisions 1 on bad and doubtful loans. Well-known cases of signiÞ-cant under-provisioning in recent history include the French Credit Lyonnais in 1993, Thailand in 1997, Japan in late 1990's (Genay, 1998) , and, more recently, China. A fair level of loan-loss provisions is needed to measure bank proÞtability, capital, and solvency.
As bank loans are, by their economic nature, private, there is not much market-based information to assess their current value in many countries, so that loan-loss provisions must often be estimated. Loan-loss provisioning is directly related to estimates of loan loss-given default (LGD). A literature on LGD on bank loans is developing but, surprisingly, it has not been exploited to address, at the micro level, the issue of provisioning at the time of default, and after the default date. As the likelihood of being repaid diminishes as time elapses after the default date, a dynamic schedule of provisioning is needed. In this study, we build on a recent LGD paper (Dermine-de Carvalho, 2005a) to develop a methodology to evaluate a fair level of provisions, at a time of default and after the default date. To illustrate, the methodology is applied to a private data set of non-performing loans. The estimated dynamic provisioning schedule is then compared to a regulatory schedule imposed by a central bank.
The banking literature has studied loan loss provisioning from several perspectives, such as impact on stock returns or contagion effects, but, to the best of our knowledge, no academic study has developed a normative methodology to estimate, at a micro level, the adequate level of loan loss provision at the time of default and over time. The contribution of the paper is to apply mortality analysis and multivariate statistics to dynamic provisioning on impaired loans. This allows to compare an empirical estimate of provisioning schedule to a regulatory schedule enforced by a central bank.
The paper is structured as follows. The literature on bank loan-loss provisioning is reviewed in Section 1 of the paper. The mortality-based approach to analyzing fair provisioning on bad and doubtful loans is discussed in Section 2. In Section 3, the database on individual loan-losses is presented. Empirical univariate estimates of dynamic provisioning are presented in Section 4, and these estimates are compared to those imposed by a central bank. Finally, a multivariate statistics approach to loan-loss provisioning is developed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Review of the Literature on Loan Loss Provisioning
The accounting and Þnance literatures have analyzed four main provisioning issues related to private information held by banks on loans, one of the fundamental characteristic which explains the economic role of banks (Diamond, 1984) : the extent of earnings and capital smoothing, the impact of reported provisions on a bank's stock returns, the systemic impact on the banking industry of disclosure on loan provisions by one bank, and the time lag between credit growth and loan losses 2 . This paper addresses a different issue. It provides a micro-based methodology to calculate fair provisions on bad and doubtful loans.
A series of papers have analyzed the extent of earnings and capital smoothing through a pro-cyclical loan-loss provisioning, with high provisions in good times and lower provisions in bad times. For instance, Laeven and Majnoni (2003) , Hasan and Wall (2004) , and Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) report empirical evidence throughout the world consistent with the earnings smoothing hypothesis 3 . Similar studies, documenting managerial discretion in loan-loss provisioning, include Wahlen (1994) 2 See the survey on loan-loss accounting by Wall and Koch (2000) . 3 A theoretical argument for earnings smoothing can be found in Degeorge et al. (1999) . 4 Related papers on bank earnings management include Barth et al. (1990) who document income smoothing through the realization of capital gains and losses, Scholes et al. (1990) , and Beatty et al. (1995) who analyze the realization of capital gains and losses A second stream of the literature has analyzed the impact of reported provisions on bank stock returns 5 . Musumeci and Sinkey (1990) and Elliott et al. (1991) report that unexpected provisions on international LDC loans had a positive impact on stock returns. Wahlen (1994) generalized the previous results in reporting that unexpected provisions have a positive impact on bank stock returns. This, at Þrst counter-intuitive, result is interpreted as a signal that future earnings will be good, allowing the build-up of provisions by bank managers.
A third stream of the loan-loss reserve literature has analyzed the signalling impact of loan-loss reserves announcements on the stock returns of the announcing bank and that of other institutions (for instance, Grammatikos and Saunders, 1990, and Docking et al., 1997).
Finally, and fourth, Jimenez and Saurina (2005) have analysed the timelag between loan growth and loan losses, calling for the build up of ex ante provisions on performing loans during periods of economic expansion.
This paper addresses a different issue: how to measure loan-loss provisions on non-performing loans. It seeks to answer questions raised by Berger et al. (1989 and who, in their critical review of market value accounting, suggest that value adjustment for credit risk should be based on a loan-loss reserve on nonperforming loans. Two approaches will be used to analyze loan-loss provisioning, a univariate mortality-based approach, and a multivariate statistical analysis of the determinants of recovery.
Loan-Loss Provisioning, a Mortality-based Approach
To calculate provisions, we shall, in a Þrst step, analyze recovery on bad and doubtful loans. Having access to the history of cash ßows on loans after default, we can study the time distribution of recovery. With reference to the studies by Altman (1989) , Altman and Suggit (2000) , and Dermine and in the context of tax planning and capital management, and Galai et al. (2003) who analyze, in a theoretical model, the timing of realized capital gains on real assets (such as buildings). 5 ReÞned in Liu et al. (1997) , the analysis shows that the positive effect is observed with banks with relatively low regulatory capital.
Neto de Carvalho (2005a), we apply the mortality approach. It examines the percentage of a bad and doubtful loan, which is recovered t months after the default date. This methodology is appropriate because the population sample is changing over time. For some default loans, we have a long recovery history (66 months), while for more recent loans in default, we have an incomplete history of recovery.
For an individual loan i in default, we deÞne four concepts 6 , t denoting the number of months after the initial default date 0 : The Cumulative Recovery Rate on a loan balance outstanding at time 0 represents the proportion of the initial defaulted loan that has been repaid (in present value terms).
For sake of presentation, the loan-loss provision was calculated on a loan balance outstanding at the default date, 0. In a more general dynamic provisions setting, the provision can be calculated on a loan balance outstanding at any date n after the default date. For instance, one can compute the cumulative recovery on loan balances outstanding 4 or 13 months after the default date. This information will allow calculating dynamic provisions on the remaining loan balance, several months after the default date.
Having computed the cumulative recovery rate on individual loans, one can compute an arithmetic average cumulative recovery rate for the sample of loans. Alternatively, one can compute a principal-weighted average recovery rate that will take into account the size of each loan. This is deÞned as follows: 
A comparison of the Sample (weighted) Cumulative Recovery Rate with the average of recovery rates on individual loans will be indicative of a size effect.
3 Bank Loan-losses, Database and Measurement Issues
To illustrate, the mortality-based approach to provisioning will be applied to real bank data. The database was provided by the largest private bank in Portugal, Banco Comercial Português (BCP). It consists of 374 defaults cases on loans to small and medium size companies 7 , evenly spread over the period June 1995 to December 2000. The use of data from a speciÞc bank is a limitation. But, given the absence of publicly available data on cash ßow recovery on distressed bank loans in Portugal, it is a step in our understanding of both the level and dynamics of fair provisions.
As a complete description of the data is available in Dermine and Neto de Carvalho (2005a), limited information is provided in this paper. The available information in the database includes the industry classiÞcation, the interest rate charged on the loan, the history of the loan after a default has been identiÞed, the type of collateral or guarantees, the internal rating attributed by the bank, the age of the Þrm, and the length of relationship with the bank 8 . In Table 1 (panel A), the various forms of guarantees, or collateral, are reported. These include:
• Financial collateral (bank deposits, bonds or shares).
In 35.6% of the cases, there is no guarantee or collateral. Personal guarantees, which are used in 58.3% of the cases, refers to written promises made by the guarantor (often the owner or the Þrm's director) that allows the bank to collect the debt against the personal assets pledged by the guarantor. Collateral is used in 15.0% of the cases 9 .
Panel B of Table 1 shows the age of the Þrm, and the number of years of relationship with the bank. Companies have, on average, a life of 17 years, with extremes going from 6 months to 121 years. The average relationship with the bank is six years 10 . Table 2 reports the concentration of default cases in different business sectors and the use of guarantee/collateral across these sectors. Fifteen business sectors have been created, with reference to the European Union's NACE economic activity codes. Further aggregation, used in the econometric tests, leads to four activity sectors: real sector (activities with well-identiÞed real assets, such as land, mines or real estate property, which could be used for security), manufacturing, trade and services. Default cases are observed in all business sectors, with a concentration in construction (13% of default cases), wholesale and retail trade (44%) and services (10%). The relative use of personal guarantee or collateral seems to be uniformly spread across the four aggregated activity sectors.
Any empirical study of credit risk and loan provisioning raises two measurement issues. Which criterion should be used to deÞne the time of the default event? Which method should be used to measure the recovery rate on a defaulted transaction?
The criterion used for the classiÞcation of a loan in the 'default' category is critical for a study on provisions, as a different classiÞcation would lead to different results. Three 'default' deÞnitions are used in the literature: i) A loan is classiÞed as 'doubtful' as soon as "full payment appears to be questionable on the basis of the available information".
ii) A loan is classiÞed as 'in distress' as soon as a payment (interest and/or principal) has been missed.
iii) A loan is classiÞed as 'default' when a formal restructuring process or bankruptcy procedure is started.
In this study, because of data availability, we adopt the second deÞnition, that is, a loan is classiÞed as 'in default' as soon as a payment is missed. For information, the reporting to the Central Bank of Portugal takes place after thirty days, if the loan remains unpaid or unrestructured.
in bankruptcy regimes explain the intensity of collateral use. 10 The relatively short average relationship is due to the fact that the bank was created in 1985, after the deregulation of the Portuguese banking system.
The second methodological issue relates to the measurement of recovery on defaulted loans, as provisions will be the amount that will not be recovered. There are two approaches, market LGD and workout LGD (Schuermann, 2005):
i) The price of the loan, deÞned most frequently as the trading price one month after the default (For instance, Emery, Cantor and Arner, 2004, and Varma and Cantor, 2005) .
ii) In the workout LGD, the recovery is equal to the discounted value of future cash ßows recovered over time after the default date.
As no market price data are readily available for defaulted bank loans in Portugal, the second methodology -the present value of actual recovered cash ßows-is the only feasible alternative. This approach was adopted by Asarnow and Edwards (1995), Carty and Lieberman (1996) (2005) for Germany. While these authors did not have access to the interest rate charged on individual loans and had to rely on an approximation of credit-risk adjusted yield curve, data on interest rates charged on the loans are available in this study. The present value of cash ßows recovered on impaired loans allows to measure the proportion of principal and interest that is recovered after the default date. This approach has the advantage that, if a loan is fully repaid, the present value of actual cash ßows recovered will be equal to the outstanding balance at the default date. It should be noted that this amount could differ from the price of the loan at a time of default, which would incorporate the expected cash ßows and adequate risk or liquidity premia 11 .
In order to measure the cash ßows recovered after a default event, we tracked, each month, the post-default credit balances. Capital recovery is a reduction in the total balance. The total cash ßow recovered is this capital recovery plus the interest on the outstanding balance.
Loan-Loss Provisioning, Empirical Evidence with a Mortality-based Approach
The application of the mortality-based approach to calculate dynamic provisions is followed by a comparison with the mandatory dynamic provisioning imposed by the Central Bank of Portugal.
Dynamic Loan-Loss Provisioning, Empirical Evidence
The sample marginal and cumulative recovery rates for the sample T months after the default date, SMRR T and SCRR T , respectively, are reproduced in Figures 1 and 2 . One observes, in Figure 1 , that most of the marginal recovery rates in excess of 5 % occur in the Þrst Þve months after the default. In Figure 2 , one observes that the cumulative recovery rate is almost completed after 48 months, and that the weighted cumulative recovery rates are lower than the unweighted cumulative recovery rates. For instance, the unweighted cumulative recovery rate after 48 months is 70%, while the weighted recovery rate is 56.3 %. This is indicative of a size effect. Cumulative recovery on large loans appears to be lower.
Cumulative recovery on outstanding balances on bad and doubtful loans are reported in Table 3 . These dynamic cumulative recoveries are calculated on loan balances outstanding n months after the default date, with n varying from 0, the time of Þnancial distress, to 37 months after the default date. Estimates of dynamic recoveries will allow the calculation of dynamic provisioning on expected loan-losses, n months after the default date. One Þrst observes, for the total sample, that the reported difference between unweighted and weighted recoveries is signiÞcant at time zero, the time of default, (72.6% vs. 63.8%, respectively), but less signiÞcant at later dates (for instance, 33% vs 35.8%, 19 months after the default date). This is expected as, in Figure 2 , the difference between the weighted and the unweighted cumulative recovery rates does not increase through time. Over time, the weighted (and unweighted) cumulative recovery rates on the unpaid loan balance are decreasing monotonously over time, 55.7% (57.8%) in period 4, to 23,3% (17.1%) in period 37. More complete information is obtained, in Table 3 , by dividing the sample into three groups, according to the absence of personal guarantee/collateral, the existence of personal guar-antee, or the existence of collateral support. As expected, the cumulative recovery rates (unweighted, so as not to be affected by the size effect) is the highest for the case of loans with collateral for every period, for instance 85.3% at time 0, the default date. A counterintuitive and signiÞcant observation is that the (unweighted) cumulative recovery rates on loans without any type of real or personal guarantee dominates, in every period, the cumulative recovery rate on loans with personal guarantees. For instance, at time 0, (unweighted) recoveries on loans without any type of guarantee/collateral is 80.6%, vs.63.9% for recoveries on loans with personal guarantee (or 47.0% vs. 20.8%, 19 months after the default date). This empirical result could be caused by two factors. First, guarantee or collateral support is not usually requested from reliable clients, so that the existence of a guarantee is an indicator of greater risk. Second, some borrowers are able to shift ownership of personal assets to other persons, so that, when the bank tries to execute the debt, there is not much left. This empirical result, if conÞrmed in other studies, implies that regulatory provisions should not penalize loans without personal guarantee, as the absence of a guarantee might be justiÞed by higher expected recoveries.
In Figures 3a and b , we show the dynamic cumulative recoveries on unpaid balance at months 4 and 25. Cumulative recovery after 68 months reaches 60% on loan balances outstanding four months after the default date. It reaches around 30% on loan balances outstanding 25 months after the default date. The frequency of cumulative recoveries on unpaid balance at months 4 and 25 are reported in Figures 4a and b . These show a bipolar distribution of cumulative recoveries on outstanding balance at month 4, but that there are few cases of full recovery on balances outstanding at month 25 12 .
Loan-Loss Provisioning: Central Bank Mandatory Provisions vs. Mortality-based Provisions
In Table 4 , we report the provisions rules of the Bank of Portugal for bad and doubtful loans for applications other than consumer credit or residence credit. The 1% provisions rule for time "0 to 3 months after default" reßects the central bank's policy of imposing a conservative general provisions of 1% on all outstanding bank loans in Portugal. A Þrst observation is that speciÞc provisioning on bad and doubtful loans starts 3 months after the default date, that is, two months after the loan is reported to the Bank of Portugal. A second observation is that provisioning is increasing through time with 100% provision required at month 13 for loans with no personal guarantee/collateral, at month 19 for loans with personal guarantee, and at month 31 for loans with collateral. A third observation is that recoveries on loans without guarantee/collateral are assumed to be the lowest, at all points in time. It is quite interesting to compare the regulatory provisioning schedule of a central bank, from the one that could be inferred from the empirical estimates of cumulative recoveries. A word of caution applies. The comparison, being based on a data set of a single bank, can capture some of the bank's idiosyncracies.
In Figures 5a,b ,c, we report the provisioning schedule of the central bank several months after the default date and the provisioning schedule implied by the estimates reported in Table 3 , for loans with no guarantee/collateral, loans with personal guarantee, and loans with collateral support. A Þrst observation is that the regulatory practice of enforcing speciÞc provisions three months after the default event does not seem justiÞed by the data. Provisioning should start at the time of the default event. A second observation is that the provisioning on loans without guarantee/collateral is excessively conservative. It calls for 100% provisioning 13 months after the default date, when our data shows an expected (weighted) recovery of 66.7%. A third observation is that the provisioning on loans with personal guarantee is too optimistic. It calls for provisioning of 50%, 13 months after the default date, when the data shows an expected recovery of only 20.5%. It is only in the case of loans with collateral support that the divergence between the estimated and the regulatory schedule is minimal.
Loan-Loss Provisioning, a Multivariate Analysis
In the previous section, univariate mortality-based estimates of cumulative recoveries and provisions were provided. In this section, we attempt to estimate empirically the determinants of the cumulative recovery rates and dynamic provisions. A discussion of the choice of explanatory variables and the econometric speciÞcation is followed by the empirical results.
Explanatory variables and econometric specification
Explanatory variables include the size of the loan, past cumulative recovery rate, the default year, the age of the Þrm, the industry sector and the type of guarantee/collateral support. The size of the loan is included because some empirical studies and the sample univariate weighted and unweighted average cumulative recovery data have pointed out the effect of the loan size. Past cumulative collection is included on the assumption that a good level of collection could indicate a genuine effort by the borrower to repay the loan fully. A year dummy will capture the volatility of the recovery rate over time. The age of the Þrm is included because problems of asymmetric information could be reduced in the case of older, more established Þrms. The industry sector will allow to test whether activities with well identiÞed real assets, such as land, mines or real estate property, show higher recoveries on bad and doubtful loans. Finally, it is of interest to know the impact of guarantee/collateral, as, if statistically signiÞcant, this variable could be taken into account in calculating loan-loss provisions on bad and doubtful loans.
Additional explanatory variables have also been tested: the number of years of the client's relationship with the bank, the annual GDP rate of growth, the frequency of default in the industry sector, the rating of the borrower, and the interest rate on the loan. The number of years of relationship could have an effect on the effort of a distressed borrower to repay his or her debt, to protect the information-based value created by the relationship. GDP growth or the frequency of default in the industry could affect the level of recovery, as some studies (for instance Frye, 2000a 
The quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE) estimators of beta are consistent and asymptotically normal (Gourieroux, Montfort and Trognon, 1984).
Empirical Results
The log-log function has been estimated for the cumulative recovery rates (recovery measured until month 48) 13 on balances outstanding at month 0, 4, 7, 13, 19, 25, and 37. The results are reported in Table 5 . The results conÞrm those of the univariate mortality-based approach, and add new insights. First the coefficient of the personal guarantee is negative and statistically signiÞcant at most time horizons. That is, losses and provisions on loans with personal guarantee are signiÞcantly higher than on loans with no guarantee/collateral. They should not receive preferential treatment in terms of provisioning. Second, the coefficient of collateral is positive at all time intervals, although statistically signiÞcant at two horizons only, 0 and 4 months. Third, and most interestingly, is the sign of the past recovery variable. It is positive and statistically signiÞcant at all horizons, 4 to 37 months, indicating that past recovery is a good indicator of future recovery. Fourth, the loan size has a negative impact on recovery at time zero, conÞrming the observed univariate differences between unweighted and weighted recoveries. The loan variable was not included in the regressions on later recoveries, as it was found to be negatively correlated with the past recovery variable. Fifth, the manufacturing and trade sectors have lower recoveries than the real sector, which includes agriculture, mining, construction, hotel/restaurant, and real estate. Finally, the age of the Þrm has a positive impact on the cumulative recovery calculated from the time of default.
To assess further the magnitude of the impact of past recovery on fair loan-loss provision, we use the estimated regression to simulate the level of fair provisions for different levels of past recovery. These are reported in Table 6 . If, for instance, one considers the balance outstanding seven months after the default date on a loan with no guarantee/collateral, one observes that the level of provisions should be 53% when past recovery has been zero, but that this provisions falls to 18% in the case of a past recovery of 50%. Although one would need additional empirical research to conÞrm these results, it appears that, for this sample of loans, past recovery has a signiÞcant impact on loan-loss recoveries and on the level of fair loan-loss provisions.
Conclusions
A fair level of provisions on bad and doubtful debt is an essential part of capital regulation and bank solvency. Micro data on recovery overtime on bad and doubtful loans allows us to provide two methodologies to compute dynamic provisions, at the time of default and over time. A univariate mortalitybased approach allows us to compute provisions for three classes of loans: no guarantee/collateral, personal guarantee only, and collateral with or without guarantee. A multivariate approach facilitates analyzing more precisely the determinants of loan recoveries and provisions over time. Three main empirical results are as follows. First, bad and doubtful loans with no guarantee/collateral exhibit better recoveries than loans with personal guarantee. This could be due to the fact that the decision to lend without guarantee took into account the higher expected recovery rates. Second, the past recovery history has a highly signiÞcant positive impact on future recovery. Third, a comparison with the Bank of Portugal mandatory provisioning rules indicates some regulatory conservatism in calling for 100% provision 31 months after the default date, when, in fact, signiÞcant amounts are still recovered after that date. But, much more stringent provisions should be enforced in the shorter run, before the "90-day"-provisioning trigger date. A word of caution is that this study, being based on a dataset of a single bank in a speciÞc time period, can capture some of the bank's idiosyncracies. Additional empirical studies are needed to validate the empirical Þndings of the paper, but the two methodologies presented in this paper provides a basis to estimate loan-loss provisions on bad and doubtful bank loans. Note: These are cumulative recovery rates up to month 68, calculated on the loan balance outstanding n months after the default date. The unweighed average recovery is the arithmetic average of recoveries on individual loans. Weighted average recovery are weighted by loan balances. The table presents the result of the log-log regression. The dependent variable is the cumulative recovery rate on loan balances outstanding at 4, 7, 13, 19 , 25, and 37 months after the default date. The explanatory variables include a constant term, the percentage for the initial loan already recovered, the loan size, a dummy for personal guarantee, and collateral. Because of data availability, the cumulative recovery is calculated up to 48 months after the default date. This is unlikely to create a bias as Figure Two indicates that most of the recovery is achieved 48 months after the default date. Note: The level of provisioning (provision = 1 -cumulative future recovery) is estimated with the regressions reported in Table 4 . These are estimates for the manufacturing sector for a loan with average size and average age. Note: This Þgure presents the marginal recovery n-months after default. The mortalitybased approach is used to calculate the marginal recoveries. Time (number of months after default)
Weighted Unweighted
Notes: The Þgure presents the cumulative weighted and unweighted recovery rates nmonths after default. They have been calculated with the mortality-based approach. Bank of Portugal Provisioning rules Estimated Provisioning
